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Recent discoveries in behavioral economics have led to important new insights concerning what can
happen in markets.  Such gains in knowledge have come primarily via laboratory experiments—a
missing piece of the puzzle in many cases is parallel evidence drawn from naturally-occurring field
counterparts.  We provide a small movement in this direction by taking advantage of a unique opportunity
to work with a Chinese high-tech manufacturing facility.  Our study revolves around using insights
gained from one of the most influential lines of behavioral research—framing manipulations—in an
attempt to increase worker productivity in the facility.  Using a natural field experiment, we report
several insights.  For example, conditional incentives framed as both “losses” and “gains” increase
productivity for both individuals and teams.  In addition, teams more acutely respond to bonuses posed
as losses than as comparable bonuses posed as gains.  The magnitude of the effect is roughly 1%: 
that is, total team productivity is enhanced by 1% purely due to the framing manipulation.  Importantly,
we find that neither the framing nor the incentive effect lose their importance over time; rather the
effects are observed over the entire sample period.  Moreover, we learn that worker reputation and
conditionality of the bonus contract are substitutes for sustenance of incentive effects in the long-run
production function.
Tanjim Hossain









jlist@uchicago.edu  1   
One of the pillars within an entrenched branch of behavioral research is the power 
of framing:  the manner in which a decision is presented has been found to affect 
individual actions  considerably.  Such effects are closely related to other  behavioral 
anomalies, such as the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980), status quo bias (Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser, 1988), and observed divergences of willingness to pay and willingness to 
accept measures of value (Hanneman, 1991).  They are broadly consistent with a notion 
of loss aversion, an insight gained from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory, 
which surmises that carriers of utility are changes relative to a neutral reference point 
rather than absolute levels.   
Although considerable laboratory evidence of such behavioral biases  has 
accumulated in the literature,1 a natural inclination for many economists is to discount 
such results on the grounds that they reflect either poorly designed experiments (e.g. they 
lack sufficient incentives for meaningful response) or are merely the result of a mistake 
made by inexperienced laboratory subjects who through time learn to overcome such 
biases (see, e.g., List, 2003, 2004).  While work has begun to extend the empirical results 
from the lab to the field, there is limited evidence on first-order questions such as:  can 
behavioral insights, such as simple framing manipulations, have economically significant 
effects in the field?2
                                                            
1 For a recent clever example of how framing can influence choice in the lab, please see Ellingsen et al. 
(2008). 
  This is not surprising in light of the difficulties associated with 
executing a clean empirical test of such phenomena in the field.  When such data are 
available, it is difficult to separate the consequences of factors of primary interest from 
the host of simultaneously occurring stimuli.   
2 One notable exception is work on the status quo effect, which reveals the power of the status quo when 
agents make retirement allocations or insurance decisions (see Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).   2   
In this study, we report data from a  natural field  experiment executed with 
Wanlida Group Co., a high tech  Chinese  enterprise engaged in the production and 
distribution of consumer electronics.    Wanlida is one of the top 100 electronics 
enterprises in China, with centers located in Nanjing, Zhangzhou, and Shenzhen, and 
employs over 20,000 employees.  The experiment revolved around using different bonus 
schemes with a subset of Wanlida employees to learn if  simple  incentives and their 
concomitant frames influenced productivity, both among teams (groups) of workers and 
among individual workers.   
During our experiment, which lasted almost six months in total, subjects engaged 
in their regular tasks, and had standard work schedules.  As per company policy, the 
bonus incentives were paid in addition to the base income, and employees were notified 
of the bonuses via personal letters.  The main insights gained in the experiment come 
from a comparison of productivity measures across a baseline and two treatments:  in the 
positively framed bonus (“reward”) treatment employees are notified that if the week’s 
average per-hour production reaches a certain threshold, a bonus is paid at the end of the 
pay period.  In the negatively framed bonus (“punishment”) treatment, employees are 
provisionally given the bonus before the work week begins, but are notified that if the 
average per-hour production does not reach a certain threshold, it is retracted at the end of 
the pay period.  In this way, the bonus schemes are isomorphic, except for the frame.  
Nevertheless, prospect theory conjectures that since losses loom larger than gains, the 
punishment treatment should outperform the reward variant.  Alternatively, if workers are 
more invigorated by positive incentive schemes, the reward treatment should lead to a 
higher level of productivity.   3   
We report some interesting data patterns.  First, incentives increase productivity 
for bonuses framed as either reward or punishment for both groups of workers and 
individual workers.  Second, the punishment frame outperforms the bonus frame in both 
the individual and group treatments, with observed differences slightly above 1%.  That 
is, total productivity increases by 1% when moving from the reward to the punishment 
treatment.  The differences for the group treatments are statistically significant and robust 
to various controls, whereas the individual differences are much less robust.  Thus, our 
experiment provides an example of prevalence of loss aversion in a natural labor market.  
Moreover, we find a market scenario where behavioral biases are stronger among groups 
than among individuals.  Finally, we observe such effects over the entire sample period, 
suggesting the power of simple framing manipulations in enhancing productivity.  If 
sustained, 1% increase in productivity purely due to the framing of incentive schemes 
implies economically significant long-term growth of the economy. 
We view these results as potentially speaking to several diverse research areas.  
First, within economics, they highlight the power of incentives and illustrate how an 
important insight from behavioral economics can be useful in the workplace.  Second, 
they complement the burgeoning field of industrial psychology by expanding the 
available tool kit that scholars and practitioners might wish to consider to enhance plant-
level productivity.  In this sense, the finding that worker reputation and the conditionality 
of the bonus contract are substitutes is an important consideration both normatively and 
positively.  Finally, our results speak to the literature in the broader social sciences on 
how social structure and institutions serve as important constraints influencing behavior 
(see, e.g., Landa and Wang, 2001).     4   
II. Experimental Design and Results 
 
  The experiment was conducted over the months of July, 2008 to January, 2009, in 
Wanlida’s factory in Nanjing.  Wanlida focuses on consumer electronics and specializes 
in  digital AV products, notebook PCs and peripherals, GPS navigation devices, car 
multimedia electronics, small home appliances, communication  devices, and lithium 
polymer batteries.  Our subjects included both groups of workers producing as a team and 
individual inspectors working independently.  The group treatments pertained to 
production of DVD players, digital photo frames, and associated parts, while our 
individual treatments pertained to inspections of some of these products.   
  Table 1 provides a summary of our experimental design.  The table can be read as 
follows:  in row 1 we summarize set G-1 (denoting group 1), which includes 3 unique 
teams of workers whose task it is to produce chips for DVD players.  All three teams had 
group sizes of 14.  We observed workers for one or two weeks before the experiment, and 
then we initiated the experiment with Round 1.  In Round 1, from July 28-August 22, 
Team  A  of set G-1  was in the Reward treatment, Team  B  was in the Punishment 
treatment, and Team C began in the baseline.  In Round 2, which started on August 25, 
the teams changed treatments for a four week period.  We then observed workers for at 
least one week after the experimental treatments were terminated.3
  The other five group sets were conducted similarly, with the main difference 
being that treatments of these sets were completed with 2 teams.  Hence, a comparison of 
pre-  and post-experimental  productivity  with productivity under treatment is the 
information used to measure the overall effect of bonuses on productivity for these sets.   
   
                                                            
3Team C of set G-1 was terminated during the first round of the 4-week treatment because of a pre-planned 
re-structuring of the production process.     5   
  The two sets of individual inspectors had 11 and 10 workers.  For sets I-1 and I-2, 
we had baseline observations throughout the sample period.  Moreover, because Wanlida 
was also interested in unconditional bonuses, we also included a Gift treatment, where 
the  inspector  received an unconditional bonus for 4 weeks without any productivity 
requirement.  Although not all inspectors spent time on our target work in every week, 
each inspector participated in the target work in at least one week of a 4-week round.4
  At this point, it is important to consider how an individual or group can alter 
productivity in the plant.  In the case of individual inspectors in sets I-1 and I-2, there is a 
ready balance of product to inspect at any given time period, therefore the inspectors can 
move at their own rate.  Among the groups, set G-6 and a portion of set G-1 have belt 
lines.  For these two sets, workers may adjust the speed of lines to accommodate an 
increase of productivity.   For sets  G-2 and G-5, there are guide rails that run 
automatically, but the pace of work is flexible in that workers can move items by hand to 
accommodate  their  working pace.   Finally, there are no lines for sets  G-3  and  G-4, 
permitting workers to adjust their working pace in a flexible manner.
  In 
the inspector treatments, the periods consisted of three or four 4-week rounds.  The other 
main  difference between the individual and team  sets  is that the individual bonuses 
depend only on one’s own productivity, whereas all members of a team have the same 
rate of productivity.   
5
                                                            
4 The amount an individual worker devoted to target work, the work for which we were paying the bonus, 
depended on the demand for different jobs within the factory.  When an individual was not working on our 
target work, they worked on other jobs assigned by Wanlida.  As a result, the number of observations 
across rounds is different, as seen on Table 3. Moreover, the set I-2 received 12 weeks, or 3 rounds of 
treatment, as the management could offer us only 12 weeks of treatment due to a reduction in the 
production of the P-720 mainboard. 
   
5 Even for sets G-1 and G-6, the conveyor belt runs continuously and worker productivity is not rigidly 
related to the belt speed.  For instance, if all workers move faster, their productivity increases because 
product is completed rather than passed along.  In terms of management, there is a manager in charge of a   6   
A.  Treatments 
Since our goal was to execute a natural field experiment, we worked closely with 
Wanlida management in making the treatments follow company guidelines.  Under this 
approach, there are two reasons why our particular framing treatments might not produce 
results that are significantly different from one another.  First, the framing treatment is a 
passive one.  For instance, in the punishment treatment, rather than actually giving the 
employees the bonus money  before the work week  commenced, we provisionally 
allocated them the bonus, to be paid at the end of the pay period.  For example, in the 
punishment treatment, the relevant portion of the letter read:   
“for every week in which the weekly production average of your team is below 
400 units/hour, the salary enhancement will be reduced by RMB 80……”  
 
Conversely, in the reward treatment, the relevant description was changed to 
 
“you will receive an RMB 80 bonus for every week the weekly production 
average of your team is above or equal to 400 units/hour……”   
 
Thus, the punishment treatment is not a particularly powerful variant, but one the firm 
felt was appropriate and natural for this environment.   
Further, we intentionally did not call the reduction in payment in the punishment 
treatment a fine or punishment to reduce potential negative (emotional) connotations.  
Instead, we were interested in making the reward and punishment treatments  merely 
different framings of the same incentive program.  As such, the payments were made at 
the same time for all teams or individuals within a set, thus eliminating any credibility or 
time discounting issue.  The differences are, therefore, extremely thinly veiled as there is 
no difference in the timing or method of the payment to the workers.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
set.  They are “management officials,” and do not set the pace of production in a micro sense and therefore 
are not included in our incentive schemes.   7   
  Second, while our experimental design relies on both between- and within-unit 
variation, the power of our design is derived from comparing within-unit data.  This is 
because there is heterogeneity in production both within and across sets.  In light of the 
fact that one  might consider our treatments  quite  transparent,  our within-unit 
experimental design is a demanding test  to  detect  significant treatment  differences 
because workers might readily deduce that the two  frames yield isomorphic payoff 
schedules (see MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979, for a broader discussion of this issue).   
Before moving to the results summary, we should note a few other experimental 
particulars of interest.  First, the Gift treatment followed the other treatments, but the 
letter contained this passage replacing the appropriate treatment language above: 
“For the next 4 weeks from July 28 to August 23, in addition to your standard 
salary,  you will receive a one-time salary enhancement of RMB 320.  This 
payment will be paid on August 25.” 
 
Second, workers were never aware that an experiment was taking place, and they did not 
know that a treatment change would occur.  The source of the salary enhancements in the 
letter to subjects was intentionally kept vague and workers were not asked to do any 
unusual work.  The electronics manufacturer itself has been casually analyzing incentive 
schemes to improve productivity to maintain its competitive edge.  As a result, such an 
incentive is not an alien concept to the workers.  Furthermore, workers in the baseline 
treatments did not receive a letter when they were working within the baseline weeks.  
Third, at the spot exchange rate during the weeks of the experiment, RMB 80 equaled 
roughly USD 11.72.6
                                                            
6 The average exchange rate during the experiment was RMB 1 = USD 0.1465. 
  The workers are under fixed wage contracts.  Since the average 
   8   
weekly salary of these workers is between RMB 290-375, this represents more than 20% 
of the weekly salary of the highest-paid worker.   
Fourth, we set the targets based on the observational data that we collected before 
the  experiment  and our conversations  with management, who desired  targets  to  be 
achieved in 60%-80% of cases.  At the end of each week, we received a detailed report 
on daily production, number of actual hours worked, and the number of units produced 
that were found defective for each team or individual.  The main variable of interest was 
the average hourly production for a given week as the incentive schemes were specified 
for weekly per hour productivity rate.  This average productivity rate equals the total 
production by a group or individual inspector in a week divided by the number of hours 
they worked in that week.  Another variable of interest is the defect rate for a week which 
equals the number of defected products divided by the number of total products the group 
or individual inspector produced in that week.  The subjects were officially informed of 
their per-hour productivity rate for the week only at the end of the week. 
Fifth,  we were careful to  minimize  information transmission between groups 
under different treatments.  For example, different teams within a set in the group 
treatments were located in separate rooms, if not floors.  We also asked the production 
managers to take steps to  reduce  comparison of treatments across  workers under the 
individual inspector setting.  Furthermore, all teams and individuals ultimately 
experienced all of the treatments by the end of the 6-month long experiment, affording us 
both between-  and within-worker variation.  Importantly,  production managers were 
unaware of our direct research hypothesis related to framing, rather they were informed 
that the test revolved around understanding incentives.  A Mandarin-speaking   9   
representative of our research team also periodically visited the factory to ensure proper 
execution of the experiment, smooth transition of the rounds, and to oversee the payment 
to the workers after the end of a round.  Finally, including the pre and post-treatment 
control periods, holidays and occasional suspension of work, the entire experiment lasted 
roughly 6 months, and 165 Wanlida workers participated in our experiment. 
B.  Experimental Results 
  Tables 2 and 3 contain a summary of the raw data—weekly per-hour productivity 
and defect rates, with Table 2 (3) summarizing the team (individual) data at the set level.  
The tables can be read as follows.  In Table 2 in set G-1, in the first 4 weeks the reward 
treatment had an average of 401 units produced whereas the punishment treatment had an 
average of 402 units produced per hour.  In weeks 5-8, the reward treatment had 429 
units produced whereas the punishment treatment had 430 units produced per hour.  For a 
within-team assessment one needs to compare numbers from each set diagonally.  For 
example, for set G-1, the punishment treatment induced 30 more units of production 
(430-400)  per hour from one team  and for the other team  the reward treatment 
outperformed the punishment treatment (429-402).   
  The raw data suggest that there might be some important differences across 
treatments, and that the incentive schemes might be working, but a more rigorous data 
analysis is necessary.  Upon doing so, a first result emerges: 
Result 1:  There is evidence that framing can be used to enhance 
productivity, but it is much more robust for groups than for individuals 
 
One approach to provide empirical support for our first result is to compute a difference-
in-differences estimate at the set level.  Suppose the average per-hour production of team 
j of set i under treatment k∈{R, P} at time t is  ijt ij k ij it P µ κµ η = ++ , where µij is the   10   
inherent productivity level of team j in set i and ηit is a time-specific productivity shock 
to all teams in set i.  Here κP – κR will quantify the framing effect.  Suppose Team A of 
set i is under reward and punishment treatments in Rounds 1 and 2, respectively, and the 
treatment sequence is reversed for Team B of the same set.  Then, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 11 1
2 22 2
1 , 1 ,
1 , and  1 .
iA R iA i iB P iB i
iA P iA i iB R iB i
PP
PP
κµ η κµ η
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Hence, we need to compute the across-rounds difference of the productivity differences 
between Teams B and A to estimate the framing effect.  For example, for set G-2 we find 
that the punishment treatment yielded 29 more units of product ((424 – 402) – (433 – 
440)).  This is identical to summing the differences in productivity between punishment 
and reward treatments across the two rounds.  Results from this exercise for each of the 
six team sets are summarized in Figure 1.  Interestingly, the figure shows that in 5 of 6 
sets the punishment treatment outperformed the reward treatment.   
For the individual inspector sets, treatments are not flipped in two consecutive 
rounds as was done for the group experiment.  Rather, the four treatments were assigned 
cyclically to individuals over the four rounds.  As a result, a  parallel  difference-in-
differences analysis of the individual data is not obvious.  Nevertheless, it can be easily 
shown that we can estimate the framing effect in exactly the same manner:  sum the 
differences in average productivity from punishment and reward treatments within a 
round,  over  all rounds.    This exercise  produces  Figure  2,  which  reveals  a similar   11   
behavioral pattern:  we learn that the punishment treatment tends to increase productivity 
on average, where the effect is driven by set I-1.  Dividing the difference-in-differences 
measures by the target productivity level, we find a measurement of the treatment effect 
in percentage terms.  As a non-parametric estimate of the treatment effect across the eight 
sets (taking groups and individuals together), we can calculate the Wilcoxon test-statistic 
and reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect at the p < .02 level. 
To complement the ocular summary, we use the raw data to estimate a model in 
which we regress the logarithm of weekly average per-hour productivity rate on dummy 
variables for the reward and punishment treatments.  We also include a dummy variable 
for the gift treatment for the individual inspector models.  Because we have this extra 
treatment for individuals, we examine group and individual data separately.  Since it is 
possible that sets had unique time-specific productivity shocks—productivity depends on 
factors such as product specific deadlines or supply of components which vary across 
sets—we control for temporal heterogeneity by including set by week fixed effects.  We 
also experiment with using group or individual fixed effects.   
Table 4 provides the empirical estimates.  In these regressions and throughout the 
paper, we estimate the following equation or a variant of it: 
( ) 12 log Prod Reward Punish                                         (1). ijt ij it i ijt i ijt ijt αηβ β ε =++ + +  
In equation (10), Prodijt denotes the average per-hour production of set i, team j, in week 
t.  The dummy variables, Rewardijt and Punishijt, denote whether team j of set i was in the 
Reward or Punishment treatment for week t.  Both of these dichotomous variables equal 
zero for baseline weeks and pre- or post-treatment weeks.  The error term is denoted by 
εijt.  Using log of hourly productivity as the dependent variable, we can interpret the   12   
coefficient of the treatment dummies as the percentage change in the productivity due to 
treatment.  The statistical significance levels of the coefficients do not change if we use 
absolute productivity as the dependent variable instead of its logarithm.  The first column 
of Table 4 presents baseline regressions for groups with only set-specific fixed effects, 
but no group or time-specific fixed effects.  For this specification, we can replace αij with 
αi and exclude ηit in equation (1).  In specification (2), we include set and week-specific 
fixed effects; that is, we add ηit to specification (1).  We further include group-specific 
fixed effects in specification (3), which can be exactly described by equation (1).7
Columns 4 to 6 present similar regressions for individual inspectors.  Here we 
also include a dummy variable for whether the individual worker was under the Gift 
treatment.  These results are mixed.  Rather than finding a significant effect, as Figure 2 
would have suggested, even though the baseline estimates in column 4 suggest a similar 
framing effect, this result is not statistically significant.  In addition, it is not robust to 
inclusion of set-specific time fixed effects or group fixed effects.  In fact, estimates in 
columns 5 and 6 suggest that the reward treatment is more effective than the punishment 
  The 
first three columns reveal that the punishment treatment increases productivity over the 
reward treatment by roughly 1% for groups.  Using an F-test, we find that this impact is 
statistically significant when we include the set by time fixed effects under specifications 
(2) and (3).    This suggests that, upon controlling for  team  heterogeneity  and  week-
specific productivity shocks, framing an incentive scheme as punishment rather than as a 
reward induces higher productivity.   
                                                            
7 Panel data models using random effects instead of fixed effects yield similar insights, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively.  These empirical results are available upon request.  These results are also robust to the 
inclusion of lag productivity and interaction of that with the treatment dummies.  
   13   
treatment, but this cannot be distinguished from noise.  Results stay unchanged 
qualitatively if we examine other specifications or use robust standard errors.8
  Beyond treatment comparisons of framing manipulations, we can also explore the 
effect of incentives in our data.  While we have clean comparisons for our individual 
inspectors during the actual treatment period, the relevant comparison is more difficult in 
the group level data.  However, using the observations from pre- and post-experimental 
periods for all 6 sets, and the few weeks of baseline treatment of Team C in Set G-1, we 
can compare the effects of merely having incentives available on productivity.  Upon 
doing so, a second result emerges: 
  If we 
examine between-group variation exclusively in the first round when each worker has 
experienced only one treatment, we find exactly the same qualitative result.  For groups, 
the productivity increase in the punishment treatment is statistically significant with time 
fixed-effects while the framing effect is never statistically significant for individuals. 
Result 2:  There is evidence that our pecuniary incentives considerably enhanced 
productivity for both teams and individuals 
 
Evidence to support this result can be found in Table 5, where we summarize the raw 
data by comparing productivity when incentives are in place versus when they are not in 
place.9
                                                            
8 A point to note is that treatment effects on variances in productivity is not systematic and parametric F-
tests of equality of variances for all eight sets together, suggests that the reward and punishment treatments 
yield similar variances. 
  That is, we pool the incentive treatments for this ocular comparison. Overall, 
incentive treatments increased productivity for 7 out of the 8 sets, and on the top end, 
productivity was almost 12% and 18% higher under the incentive treatments compared to 
the baseline for sets G-3 and I-2.  The baseline includes both pre- and post-treatment 
9 For economists, this might seem like a rather mundane result, but scholars in sister fields might find this 
result rather surprising—see the discussion of incentives in the workplace in Kohn (1993), for example.   14   
periods.  Potential inertia in productivity, thus, makes this estimate a conservative 
estimate of incentive effects. 
Table 5, of course, does not account for time-specific productivity shocks that sets 
may endure.  For a better measurement of the incentive effects, we return to Table 4.  
Recall that the treatment coefficients provide an estimate of the incentive effect, thus, the 
regression results complement the insights gained from Table 5, but permit the two 
incentive treatments to vary in their success.  Table 4 reveals that productivity increases 
in the bonus treatments for both individual and group data are sizable.  Importantly, they 
are robust to inclusion of fixed effects.  For individual inspectors, the Gift treatment, 
where workers received an unconditional gift as a one-time salary enhancement of RMB 
320 for a 4-week round, allows us to explore the impact of an incentive scheme that is not 
dependent on productivity.  The coefficient  estimates  suggest that even  when the 
incentive is unconditional, it increases productivity compared to the baseline.   
Note that we chose a specific target for a set and used the same target throughout 
our experiment.  As mentioned earlier, this target was chosen based on  the pre-
experiment average productivity and in consultation with management.  Exactly where 
the target is set does not seem to affect productivity; the target level has a statistically 
insignificant coefficient when we include it in productivity regressions.  Hence, we do 
not include it in the regression models above.  Nevertheless, if we do include the target 
level, then the incentive and framing effect results remain unchanged. 
C.  Discussion 
  Several features of these results merit further consideration.  First, given the 
results in the literature that report individual level experience attenuates the effects of   15   
certain anomalies such as loss aversion, it is important to consider why we find treatment 
effects amongst this group of seasoned workers.  A key result within the previous 
research is that amongst agents in the field who are inexperienced, behavior varies little 
between them and students in lab experiments (see List, 2003, 2004).  Given that in our 
experiment we are only implementing a one-time change in the frame, and that workers 
likely have little experience with treatments such as our punishment treatment, the 
empirical results herein are consistent with this aspect of the previous literature that finds 
dramatic effects of experience.  We  cannot test the other part of the  experience 
hypothesis directly, but note that we view  this result as highlighting  that even in 
environments with experienced agents, if that experience does not revolve around the 
manipulation itself, it might not affect the power of that manipulation.   
Second, the result that our framing manipulation is much more powerful across 
groups of workers than individuals merits more patient discussion.  We view this result as 
fitting in well with the broader literature on the important role that salient properties of 
the situation can play.  For instance, it has been shown that environmental variables such 
as social structure (group size, group composition, etc.) and institutional infrastructure 
(the formal and informal “rules of the game”) can importantly influence behavior (see, 
for example, Paese et al, 1993, Landa and Wang, 2001, Stoddard and Fern, 2002, and in 
economics, Levitt and List, 2007).   
Several models have been proposed to explain such data patterns, ranging from 
simple economic models to models of “group polarization” in psychology (Cheng and 
Chiou, 2008) and “collective esteem” in sociology (McElroy and Seta, 2006).  Intuitively, 
these models suggest that workers in a group setting are concerned about letting fellow   16   
team members down.  In our setting, workers in a group under the punishment treatments 
may be extra careful to not be the one to cost the team the fine.10
Although our experimental design cannot parse such differences directly, we can 
delve deeper into this result by  exploring  whether there are observable differences 
between workers in the group and individual treatments that might explain the robustness 
of the framing effect for only  the  groups.  Table 6  presents the average  gender 
composition, age, education level, and tenure for workers across the various sets.   
  Moreover, a loss-averse 
worker might be more vigilant in making sure that his or her team does not incur a “fine.”  
Clearly, larger groups are more likely to contain at least one highly loss-averse worker 
than smaller groups; ceteris paribus, effectively making teams more susceptible to loss-
aversion than individuals.   
Individual sets had a higher percentage of male workers, and that workers in the 
individual sets were relatively older  and had longer tenure at Wanlida.  However, 
individual inspectors had slightly lower levels of education than workers in groups.  In 
Table 7, we explore the framing effect while controlling for worker characteristics.  To 
execute a clean analysis of the framing effect, we examine only reward and punishment 
treatments to reduce confounds.  For groups, the productivity increase in punishment 
treatments (compared to the reward treatment) is tempered as average age or tenure of 
workers in a group increases.  Alternatively, none of the demographic characteristics has 
a significant effect on productivity difference between punishment and reward treatments 
for individual sets.  The sign of the coefficients in column 1 of Table 7 along with the 
demographic differences between group and individual sets provide some support for the 
                                                            
10 We thank Danny Kahneman for pointing this out. 
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hypothesis that the difference in the framing effect between groups and individuals might 
be due to younger and less experienced workers in group sets.  This result is consonant 
with the literature regarding the effects of experience on market anomalies.   
Whatever the mechanism at work  in our data  is,  it is important for future 
empirical work to more fully understand the dynamics of individuals versus groups when 
presented with such manipulations.  We view this area as ripe for future research, as 
worker teams are quite common in practice. 
A third area worthy of further inquiry is whether our incentives were profitable 
for the firm.  Clearly, the framing effects are “free” in the sense that once an optimal 
scheme and reward amount is determined, framing can be used to induce a greater level 
of achievement, yielding greater profits conditional on similar success rates.  We can go 
further by computing back of the envelope numbers to determine whether our particular 
incentive scheme was profitable.   
A first consideration is that even though workers increased productivity, they 
might have produced more defects, or missed important defects in the case of the 
individual inspectors.  Such a result can potentially limit,  or reverse,  our measured 
productivity gains.  Wanlida had in place rigorous quality checks for the group level 
production, and workers were well aware of such checks.  Yet, Wanlida did not “inspect 
the inspectors” formally prior to our experiment, as the inspected products would be 
tested when they are used in the next step, but the identity of the component and the 
inspectors were not clearly mapped.  Thus, one would not be able to determine the exact 
inspector who had allowed a faulty component to continue in the production process.  
With our help before the experiment, Wanlida commenced keeping records that link an   18   
inspected component with its inspector, allowing us to measure the missed defects of 
each inspector precisely.  Inspectors were made aware of this change in company policy 
before the experiment began. 
Raw defect rates summarized in Tables 2 and 3 provide the percentage of faulty 
production.  A quick look at the default rates does not suggest a large difference across 
treatments, suggesting that observed productivity increases were not importantly limited 
by quality deficiencies.  To formally test this hypothesis, we regress the defect rate on the 
log of the hourly productivity and the treatments,  controlling for the set and week-
specific fixed effects.  Table 8 summarizes these results, and shows that in neither the 
group nor the individual sets, the productivity level or the treatments have any 
statistically significant impact on the quality of the product.  This leads to our third result: 
Result 3:  There was no discernable change in product defects or faulty inspections 
associated with the change in incentives 
 
Given that the observed productivity increase was not accompanied by a perverse change 
in product quality, the next issue pertains to whether the increased productivity materially 
affected Wanlida’s bottom line.  We offer a simple estimate of profitability of the scheme 
assuming that the productivity increase compared to pre-experiment productivity is 
sustained if the workers participate on the target projects full time.  Our incentive scheme 
increased total labor costs by RMB 64,960.  This compares favorably to the increased 
labor bill that would have resulted if the company desired to increase output under their 
old incentive regime.  To estimate that number, we make use of the pre-treatment average 
productivity and the low estimate of the average cost of hiring an experienced worker of 
RMB 7, as Wanlida management suggested.  Under these assumptions, to match the extra 
quantity that our incentive scheme induced, the labor bill would have increased by more   19   
than RMB 69,900.  Thus, marginal production costs were roughly reduced by 7% with 
our bonus treatments.  This  very rough estimate  should be considered conservative 
because it does not include related costs of employment,  such as additional benefit 
payments, taxes, etc.   
This leads us to our next question—would it make sense to permanently adopt an 
incentive structure such as the one imposed in our experiment?  It is important to first 
determine whether the incentive and framing effects are persistent or temporary.  A 
temporary increase in productivity may not be worth the increased cost even if the initial 
spike is large.  As the framing effect was significant for the groups but not individuals, 
we first explore the persistence of the framing effect in the group sets.  Recall that in all 
weeks within a round, a team in a set was under the same treatment and the treatments 
switched from Reward to Punishment or vice versa in Round 2 (for sets G-1 to G-6).   
Since there is heterogeneity in productivity across teams within a  set, simply 
comparing productivities within sets over time is not useful.  Instead, to investigate the 
incentive and framing effects over time  for groups, we examine  both within-set 
productivity changes over time as well as within-group productivity differences.  From 
these exercises, the final result emerges: 
Result 4:  Neither the incentive nor framing effect wanes through time for groups  
 
As a first test of whether the treatment effects wane over time, we compare results from 
the regression models presented above with models that exclude weeks of data.  For 
example, in column 1 of Table 9, we only include observations from weeks 1 through 5 
and the pre- and post-experiment periods.  In column 2, we only include observations 
from weeks 1 through 4, week 6, and the pre and post-experiment periods.  Similarly, we   20   
use data from weeks 7 and 8 along with Round 1 data in columns 3 and 4, respectively.  
If there is significant waning of the treatment effect over time, the regression results in 
the four columns should lead to a systematic pattern in the coefficients.   
We find no trend in the coefficients and the framing effect (the difference in the 
punishment and reward coefficients) stays remarkably unchanged in all the four columns.  
As a robustness check, if we examine two weeks of Round 2 along with Round 1, that is, 
5
th and 6
th weeks with Round 1 and 7
th and 8
th weeks with Round 1, we again find that the 
framing and incentive effects are equally strong in both regressions.  Similar results are 
observed when we include group level dummy variables. 
Another approach to investigate the path of the treatment effects across time is to 
interact the treatment dummy with a dummy for the t
th week within a round (Rounds 1 or 
2) where t equals 1 through 4.  If treatment effects wane over time, the incentive and 
framing effects in weeks 1 and 5 will be larger than those in weeks 2 and 6 which, in 
turn, will be larger than those in weeks 3 and 7.  Again, we do not observe any time trend 
on the treatment effects,  although sometimes we do not get statistically significant 
treatment effects as number of observations becomes small in certain cases.  As these 
results are qualitatively the same as those in Table 9, we do not present them here but 
make them available upon request.   
Given the results summarized in Loewenstein (2005), and more recently the labor 
market results in Gneezy and List (2006) and Lee and Rupp (2008), as well as Hennig-
Schmidt, Rockenbach and Sadrieh’s (2006) field experiment, one might have suspected 
that our treatment effect would wane over time.  Importantly, these labor market results 
are completed in unconditional rather than conditional reward/punishment space, and   21   
they are typically within one-shot work environments or weaker reputational 
environments than our repeated setting.  We suspect that each of these features alone has 
the power to attenuate the waning effect observed in the literature, and together they are 
particularly powerful.  Accordingly, we view this final result as providing a boundary 
condition on the insights gained in this literature.   
We can provide further insights on this boundary condition by exploring the time 
path of productivity under the Gift treatment for individuals.  We execute similar tests as 
in Table 9 using the individual inspector data.  Table 10 shows that there is little evidence 
of a time trend in the observed incentive or framing effects  for individual workers.  
Coefficients of the three treatment dummies show no systematic trend whether we look at 
the first round and the first, second, third or fourth weeks of the following round.  Thus, 
effects of any of the incentive schemes ─ Reward, Punishment, and Gift ─ does not wane 
over time.  Since the Gift treatment uses unconditional rewards but takes place in a 
repeated game setting, these data are unique in the sense that we can test for a waning 
effect in the typical work setting over an unconditional bonus.  Using the array of tests 
discussed above, we observe little evidence of waning in the impact of the Gift treatment 
(see also, Al-Ubaydli  et al.,  2008).    We, therefore,  conclude that reputational and 
relational considerations are important when adopting conditional reward structures, and 
that conditionality and reputation serve as substitutes.   
III.  Conclusions 
Understanding  the sources of productivity  differences across space and time 
remains an important task.  Interestingly, total factor productivity ratios of 3:1 or more 
are not unusual across 90
th  percentile to 10
th  percentile producers within 4-digit SIC   22   
industries.  Syverson (2009) provides a discussion of the determinants of productivity and 
the underlying productivity differences observed at the micro-level, but a missing 
component of the vast  productivity literature is a causal test of the effects of what 
behavioral economists might deem as first order.  At the same time, whether and to what 
extent observations from the lab spill over to the field remains a central issue within the 
experimental sciences.   
  In this paper, we combine the literatures on understanding productivity 
enhancements with behavioral economics to explore whether a foundational insight 
gained from the latter literature can speak to the former.  We find that it can:  a simple 
framing manipulation changed productivity by roughly 1% for teams of workers.  
Economic significance of this difference is clearer when we recall that this increase in 
higher productivity comes at no extra cost, rather only from the language of the contract.  
A persistent increase in productivity, even by a mere 1%, will have a large impact on 
economic growth in the long run.  Of course, there is much productivity variation not 
accounted for by such simple manipulations, but the study showcases that productivity 
gains can be had in the workplace by recognizing insights gained within the experimental 
and behavioral communities.  This study presents one of the first investigations of 
framing effects in labor productivity in the private sector.   In a methodological sense, it 
showcases how field experimental evidence can supplement insights gained from the lab 
to further our understanding of important economic issues in a more practical context.  
Our field experiments also illustrate how simple modifications to contractual language 
can play a significant role on the outcomes of incentive schemes.  This is another area of 
research that merits serious consideration.   23   
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Appendix:  Summary of Letter Contents to Workers 
 
English Translations of Sample Letters to Workers in the Different Treatments 
 
Dear ______,  
Reward 
 
We are glad to let you know that your team has been chosen into a short-term program. 
For the next 4 weeks starting from July 28, in addition to your standard salary, you will 
receive an RMB 80 bonus for every week the weekly production average of your team is 
above or equal to K units/hour.11
 
 This program will continue until the end of the week 
starting on August 18 and end on August 23. On August 25, you will receive your bonus 
according to the above criterion. 
For example, if your team produces at a rate above K units/hour in two weeks, you will 




The relevant description of the treatment was changed to:  
Punishment 
 
“For the next 4 weeks starting from July 28 to August 23, in addition to your standard 
salary, you will receive a one-time salary enhancement of RMB 320. This payment will 
be paid on August 25. However, for every week in which the weekly production average 
of your team is below K units/hour, the salary enhancement will be reduced by RMB 80. 
 
For example, if your team fails to produce at a rate of K units/hour in two weeks, your 
salary enhancement will be reduced by RMB 160. Then on August 25, you will only 
receive RMB 160.” 
 
The description of the treatment was changed to:  
Gift 
 
“For the next 4 weeks from July 28 to August 23, in addition to your standard salary, you 
will receive a one-time salary enhancement of RMB 320. This payment will be paid on 
August 25.” 
 
Note that the subjects received letters written in Traditional Chinese and the letters were 
appropriately edited for individual inspectors.  Here K denotes the target level of per-hour 




                                                            
11 Please note that a week is counted from Monday to Saturday and we will use weekly production average 
within your real working hours on the target work. Set Job Target Group
Team A reward punishment
Team B punishment reward
Team C baseline
Team A reward punishment
Team B punishment reward
Team A reward punishment
Team B punishment reward
Team A reward punishment
Team B punishment reward
Team A reward punishment
Team B punishment reward
Team A reward punishment
Team B punishment reward
Inspector 1 - Inspector 3 reward punishment baseline gift
Inspector 4 - Inspector 6 punishment gift reward baseline
Inspector 7 - Inspector 8 gift baseline punishment reward
Inspector 9 - Inspector 11 baseline reward gift punishment
Inspector 1 - Inspector 3 reward punishment baseline
Inspector 4 - Inspector 6 punishment gift reward
Inspector 7 - Inspector 8 gift baseline punishment
Inspector 9 - Inspector 10 baseline reward gift
Week 13 - 
Week 16 
(Round 4)
Table 1 reports experimental design by sets.  Each set was broken up into a number of groups (teams) each of the same group size.  "Target" denotes 
the team's target goal for per-hour productivity.  Treatments are broken down by week number.  All sets included one or two weeks of pre-experiment 
baseline observations and one week of post-experiment baseline observation.




Size Week 1 - Week 
4 (Round 1)




























G-5 Adapter plug-in 2
2
G-3
G-2 P720 main-board 
plug-in
G-4 Digital photo frame 
packaging




DVD player MD Chip 
production
3 14
2Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
Weekly Productivity 400.869 428.935 402.004 433.202 909.520 928.490 830.192 915.039 558.391 555.917 791.686 893.715
(SD) (1.393) (7.137) (5.530) (15.545) (4.561) (22.913) (85.637) (13.836) (2.334) (3.089) (7.760) (54.827)
Defect Rate 0 0 0.507% 0.313% 0 0 0.004% 0.006% 0.141% 0.163% 0.088% 0.066%
N 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Weekly Productivity 401.944 430.308 424.407 440.189 911.921 908.788 930.599 860.428 562.292 556.679 901.260 788.802
(SD) (2.701) (14.971) (8.844) (10.638) (8.298) (7.949) (19.328) (79.147) (3.381) (4.841) (56.561) (12.462)
Defect Rate 0 0 0.642% 0.369% 0 0 0.005% 0.014% 0.121% 0.136% 0.092% 0.073%





Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Weekly Productivity 106.033 111.771 109.729 93.677 50.463 55.862 55.990
(SD) (6.100) (8.926) (5.188) (6.328) (0.742) (4.063) (0.480)
Defect Rate 0 0 0.023% 0.129% 0.010% 0 0
N 7 4 11 3 12 3 5
Weekly Productivity 100.274 113.221 108.689 123.316 50.855 55.096 56.205
(SD) (10.378) (8.254) (6.798) (22.954) (0.544) (1.025) (0.697)
Defect Rate 0.036% 0.006% 0.050% 0 0.018% 0.005% 0
N 8 11 6 4 12 9 3
Weekly Productivity 102.883 109.356 105.477 115.707 50.454 55.083 56.417
(SD) (4.513) (8.232) (10.009) (24.001) (0.315) (1.093) (0.307)
Defect Rate 0.061% 0.025% 0.016% 0.031% 0 0.005% 0
N 7 11 12 7 8 10 4
Weekly Productivity 103.771 105.898 105.231 109.283 41.056 54.849 55.532
(SD) (12.169) (4.054) (4.485) (30.175) (0.916) (0.900) (0.611)
Defect Rate 0.030% 0.032% 0.003% 0.025% 0.006% 0 0





Table 2: Productivity & Defect Rates for Groups













Table 3 reports individual average weekly per-hour productivity and weekly defect rate by round, set, and treatment for 
inspectors.




















817.214 803.318 Baseline (Pre and 
Post-Treatment 







Set G-5 Set G-6 Set G-1 Set G-2 Set G-3 Set G-4(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0365** 0.0864*** 0.0846*** 0.1178*** 0.0561*** 0.0495***
(0.0158) (0.0293) (0.0252) (0.0221) (0.0155) (0.0160)
0.0470*** 0.0969*** 0.0951*** 0.1354*** 0.0439*** 0.0308**
(0.0158) (0.0293) (0.0251) (0.0209) (0.0150) (0.0155)
0.1259*** 0.0385*** 0.0339**
(0.0203) (0.0146) (0.0146)
Set-Specific Time Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Group/Individual-Specific Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
N 118 118 118 249 249 249
Adjusted R-squared 0.9655 0.9950 0.9964 0.9050 0.9685 0.9708
F-Statistic Reward = Punishment 0.66 4.53** 6.44** 0.51 0.67 1.61
Set G-1 Set G-2 Set G-3 Set G-4 Set G-5 Set G-6 Set I-1 Set I-2
Average Productivity under Baseline 415.120 429.883 817.214 803.318 526.769 831.631 100.089 45.082
(SD) (29.801) (10.120) (86.154) (131.993) (38.388) (93.615) (16.503) (7.188)
N 6 4 3 3 4 4 50 42
Average Productivity with Incentives 417.529 424.951 914.680 884.064 558.319 843.866 108.452 53.151
(SD) (16.591) (17.700) (14.311) (67.741) (4.054) (66.029) (11.806) (2.709)
N 14 16 16 16 16 16 91 66
Increase under Incentives 0.58% -1.15% 11.93% 10.05% 5.99% 1.47% 8.36% 17.90%
Table 5 compares average per-hour productivity for the baseline treatment (including pre and post-treatment periods) against the incentive treatments for each 
set.
Groups Individuals
Table 4: Treatment Effects on Producitivity




Table 4 reports empirical estimates of punishment and reward treatment effects using pre- and post-treatment periods as a 
baseline.  Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below. Specifications (1) and (4) include set specific fixed effects. 
Specifications (2) and (5), for groups and individuals respectively, include time and set fixed effects, which are specific to a set 
and week. Specifications (3) and (6) also include group/individual specific fixed effects. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Table 5: Incentive Effects on ProductivitySet G-1 Set G-2 Set G-3 Set G-4 Set G-5 Set G-6 Set I-1 Set I-2 Group Sets Individual Sets
Percentage of Male 0.286 0.100 0.143 0.286 0 0.133 0 0.409 0.155 0.184
(0.074) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.497) (0.105) (0.389)
Age (in Years) 21.811 21.475 23.214 20.250 22.208 22.967 24.852 20.523 21.991 22.908
(0.760) (1.329) (0.074) (0.863) (0.904) (0.780) (3.400) (2.816) (1.311) (3.810)
Education 0.484 0.450 0.286 0.357 0.333 0.167 0.056 0.386 0.343 0.204
(0.057) (0.155) (0.148) (0.074) (0) (0.034) (0.231) (0.493) (0.141) (0.405)
Tenure (in Months) 23.445 37.360 39.486 28.943 47.95 36.380 80.933 27.591 35.852 56.984




Gender * Punishment -0.0745 0.04300
(0.0451) (0.0562)
Age * Punishment -0.0128*** 0.0054
(0.0043) (0.0032)
Education * Punishment 0.0144 -0.0383
(0.0392) (0.0611)
Tenure * Punishment -0.0006* -0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Set-Specific Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 94 98
Adjusted R-squared 0.9968 0.9748
Table 7 reports the effect of worker characteristics on framing effect for 
both groups and individuals.  The estimates include time and set fixed 
effects, which are specific to a set and week.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
Table 7: Effect of Worker Characteristics on the Framing Effect
Dependent Variable: Log of Per-hour Productivity on a Given Week
Table 6: Demographic Data for all Sets
Table 6 reports average demographic data for all sets separately and also the aggregates for group sets and individual sets.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
For eduction: primary school=-1, junior middle school=0, high school or polytechnic school=1.  Age and tenure are as of year 2008 and July 2008, respectively.Groups Individuals








Set-Specific Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 118 249
Adjusted R-squared 0.8982 0.1301
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reward 0.0835** 0.0830** 0.0829** 0.0837**
(0.0317) (0.0310) (0.0315) (0.0324)
Punishment 0.0998*** 0.1003*** 0.1004*** 0.0996***
(0.0317) (0.0310) (0.0315) (0.0324)
Week Included from Round 2 Week 5 Week 6 Week 7 Week 8
Set-Specific Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 82 82 82 82
Adjusted R-squared 0.9939 0.9942 0.9940 0.9937
F-Statistic Reward = Punishment 5.86** 6.82** 6.84** 5.34**
Table 9 reports the effect of framing over time for groups with baseline and pre-and post-
treatment periods included.  The sample in specification (t) includes Round 1 and the t-th 
week of Round 2 with t from 1 to 4.  Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below 
the coefficients.  These estimates include set and week specific fixed effects.  ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Dependent Variable: Defect Rate in a Given Week
Table 8: Effect of Productivity on Defect Rates
Table 9: Framing Effect Over Time for Groups
Dependent Variable: Log of Per-hour Productivity on a Given Week for Groups
Table 8 reports the effect of productivity and treatment on quality 
(defect rates) for both groups and individuals.  These estimates 
include set and week specific fixed effects.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reward 0.0845*** 0.0963*** 0.0901*** 0.0961***
(0.0213) (0.0226) (0.0254) (0.0234)
Punishment 0.0689*** 0.0820*** 0.0646*** 0.0789***
(0.0214) (0.0220) (0.0240) (0.0230)
Gift 0.0689*** 0.0742*** 0.0700*** 0.0716***
(0.0220) (0.0224) (0.0243) (0.0232)
Weeks Included from Rounds 2, 3, and 4 5, 9, & 13 6, 10, & 14 7, 11, & 15 8, 12, & 16
Set-Specific Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 150 141 137 136
Adjusted R-squared 0.9616 0.9636 0.9615 0.9602
F-Statistic Reward = Punishment 5.86** 6.82** 6.84** 5.34**
Table 10: Framing Effect Over Time for Individuals
Dependent Variable: Log of Per-hour Productivity on a Given Week for Groups
Table 10 reports the effect of framing over time for groups with baseline and pre-and post-
treatment periods included.  The sample in specification (t) includes Round 1 and the t-th week 
of Rounds 2 to 4 with t from 1 to 4.  Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the 
coefficients.  These estimates include set and week specific fixed effects.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.Figure 1 displays the aggregated differences in productivity between punishment and reward treatments within 
a set for teams.  See Table 2 for absolute productivity levels of each treatment.
Figure 2 displays the aggregated differences in productivity between punishment and reward treatments within 































































Figure 1: Aggregate Differences in Per-Hour 
Productivities under Punishment and 






























































Figure 2: Aggregate Differences in Per-Hour 
Productivities under Punishment and 
Reward Treatments for Inspectors